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VALUE IN CONFISCATION CASES
NATHANIEL T. GUERNSEY

Smyth v. Ames 1 laid down the rule that under the Fourteenth
Amendment states are not permitted to impose rates upon public
utilities which afford less than a fair return on the present fair
value of the property in question, thus defining the limitation upon
the regulatory power of the states. It is proposed here to review
the authorities in order to determine whether they furnish any support for the contention that in this connection the word "value"
is not used in its ordinary, accepted sense.
Before taking this up, it is worth while to briefly review some
of the cases which preceded Smyth v. Ames. At its October
term, 1876, the Supreme Court decided Munn v. Illinois 2 and the
Granger Cases.3 These cases all presented the broad question
whether the states have the power to regulate rates. Munn v.
Illinois involved rates for storing and transferring grain at
elevators in Chicago. The GrangerCases arose out of state laws
establishing commissions whose powers included the regulation of
1169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 48 (1898).
294 U. S. H3 (1876).
3

Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155 (1876); Peik v.

Chicago & North Western Ry., 94 U. S. 164 (1876); Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul R. R? v. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179 (i876) ; Winona & St. Peter R. R. v. Blake,
94 U. S. i8o (1876) ; Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. I81 (1876).
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railroad freight and passenger rates. In Munn v. Illinois the
attack was based on the due process clause, while in the Granger
Cases the railroads relied principally upon the contention that the
laws in question were in violation of their charter contracts with
the states. In each instance the power of the state was sustained.
In Munn v. Illinois the Court said:
"The controlling fact is the power to regulate at all. If
that exists, the right to establish the maximum of charge, as
one of the means of regulation, is implied." 4
And furthermore:
"We know that this is a power which may be abused;
but that is no argument against its existence. For protection
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the
polls, not to the courts." 5
It is probable that at first both the bench and bar understood
the doctrine of these cases to be that the power of the states to
regulate rates was unrestricted. This apparently was the view of
Mr. Justice Field, who, in his dissenting opinion in Stone v.
Wisconsin, said:
"The opportunity was presented for the court to define
the limits of the power of the State over its corporations
after they have expended money and incurred obligations
upon the faith of the grants to them, and the rights of the
corporators, so that, on the one hand, the property interests
of the stockholder would be protected from practical confiscation, and, on the other hand, the people would be protected
from arbitrary and extortionate charges. This has not been
done; but the doctrine advanced in Munn v. Illinois, supra,
p. 113, has been applied to all railroad companies and their
business, and they are thus practically placed at the mercy of
the legislature of every State." 6
Apparently, it was not long before this conclusion was questioned. Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler 7 involved the
"Supra note 2, at 134.
5
Supra note 2, at 134.
'Supra note 3, at 184.
110

U. S. 347, 4 Sup. Ct. 48 (1884).
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power of the state to require the water company to submit to rates
fixed by the local board of supervisors, where the general law
under which it had been organized provided that they should be
established by a board of commissioners to be constituted as provided in that act. The Court sustained the power of the state,
saying:

"That it is within the power of the government to regulate the prices at which water shall be sold by one who enjoys
a virtual monopoly of the sale, we do not doubt. That question is settled by what was decided on full consideration in
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113.

As was said in that case,

such regulations do not deprive a person of his property
without due process of law. What may be done if the
municipal authorities do not exercise an honest judgment, or
if they fix upon a price which is manifestly unreasonable,
need not now be considered, for that proposition is not presented by this record. The objection here is not to any
improper prices fixed by the officers, but to their power to fix
prices at all." 8
What has been italicized certainly opened the door for doubt as
to whether the power to regulate was unrestricted. In the Railroad Commission Cases9 we find the same suggestion, the Court
saying:
"From what has thus been said, it is not to be inferred
that this power of limitation or regulation is itself without
limit. This power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and
limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation. Under pretence of regulating fares and freights, the state cannot require
a railroad corporation to carry persons or property without
reward; neither can it do that which in law amounts to a
taking of private property for public use without just compensation, or without due process of law."
Two years later Dow v. Beidelnan 10 failed to materially
clarify the situation. The case involved the validity of an Arkan"Ibid. 354, 4 Sup. Ct. at 51. The italics are the writer's.
r16 U. S. 307, 33r, 6 Sup. Ct. 334, 345 (1886).
20
25 U. S. 680, 8 Sup. Ct. IO28 (i888).
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sas statute fixing passenger fares at three cents per mile. Facts
were disclosed throwing some light upon the cost of the property
and its probable earnings at the proposed rates. The Court states
that the general rule of law governing the case had been developed
in the opinions in Munn v. Illinois "1 and the Granger Cases 12
immediately following it, and, in discussing these cases, says:
"The same rule was affirmed and acted on in several
other cases decided at the same time, in the first of which the
Chief Justice, in answering 'the claim that the courts must
decide what is reasonable, and not the legislature,' said:
'Where property has been clothed with a public interest, the
legislature may fix a limit to that which in law shall be reasonable for its use. This limits the courts, as well as the
people. If it has been improperly fixed, the legislature, not
the courts, must be appealed to for the change.'" 13
Notwithstanding this statement tending to support the contention that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed no limit upon the
regulatory power, the Court goes on to meet the argument that
the three-cent fare was unreasonable because it would earn only a
very small amount upon the cost of the road and upon its bonded
debt, by the reply that there was no evidence as to what the bonds
cost or as to the amount of the capital stock of the corporation as
reorganized, or as to the sum paid for the road by the reorganized
corporation or its trustees, suggesting a possibility that proper
facts might warrant a determination that the legislative rate was
unreasonable. There the following statement is made:
"Without any proof of the sum invested by the reorganized corporation or its trustees, the court has no means,
if it would under any circumstances have the power, of
determining that the rate of three cents a mile fixed by the
legislature is unreasonable. Still less does it appear that
there has been any such confiscation as amounts to a taking
of property without due process of law." 14
11

Supra note 2.
' Supra note 3.
"14Supra note io, at 687, 8 Sup. Ct. at 1029.
Supra note io, at 69o, 8 Sup. Ct. at io3x.
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This outline discloses the situation existing when Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota '5was presented to the
Court in 189o. The power to regulate had been clearly recognized in opinions which strongly suggested that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not operate as a limitation upon this power, but
statements in some later opinions indicated that this contention
had not been entirely foreclosed.
The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. case cleared up this
uncertainty. It announced the rule that the Fourteenth Amendment so limits this regulatory power of the states that rates imposed in its exercise must be reasonable. The case involved an
order of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the state of
Minnesota setting aside certain rates established by the railroad
for the transportation of milk, and substituting lower rates for
them. In a proceeding to compel the railroad to put the commission rates into effect, it asserted that these rates were not reasonable, fair or just compensation for the service rendered, and that
the pre-existing rate was reasonable, fair and just. The question
was squarely presented whether the company was entitled to a
judicial -hearing upon this contention. The statute made the
determination of the commission final, and did not allow any issue
to be made or inquiry to be had as to the equality or reasonableness of the rates in fact. The Court quoted with approval the
excerpt which has already been taken from the Railroad Commission Cases,", and decided that the Minnesota statute violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, saying, among other things:
"The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge
for transportation by a railroad company, involving as it does
the element of reasonableness both as regards the company
and as regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial
investigation, requiring due process of law for its determination. If the company is deprived of the power of charging
reasonable rates for the use of its property, and such deprivation takes place in the absence of an investigation by judicial
machinery, it is deprived of the lawful use of its property,
U. S. 418, 10 Sup. Ct. 462 (i8go).
"6Supra note 9.
35134
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and thus, in substance and effect, of the property itself,
without due process of law and in violation of the Constitution of the United States; and in so far as it is thus deprived,
while other persons are permitted to receive reasonable profits
upon their invested capital, the company is deprived of the
equal protection of the laws." 11
It will be noted that only five justices concurred in the majority opinion in this case; Mr. Justice Miller filing a concurring
opinion and three justices dissenting.
With the establishment of the two propositions: (i) that
the power to regulate existed, and (2) that rates established in
the exercise of this power must be just and reasonable, the next
step in the development of the subject involved the inquiry as to
the factors determining whether a rate fixed by public authority is
just and reasonable. And this brings us to Reagan v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co.'
The suit was brought by the Farmers' Loan
& Trust Company as trustee under a mortgage of the railroad
property to enjoin the enforcement of a schedule of rates which
had been established by the state commission of Texas.
The case was tried upon demurrers; the allegations relied
upon to show that the rates were unreasonable being that the railroad cost more than the amount of stock and bonds outstanding,
that the stock and bonds outstanding represented money invested
in its construction, that there had been no waste or mismanagement in the construction or operation of the property, that the net
earniigs were insufficient to pay the interest on the bonded debt,
that no dividends had ever been paid upon the stock representing
two-fifths of the value of the property, and that the proposed tariff
would reduce the net earnings so that only one-half of the interest
on the bonded debt could be paid. It will be noted that there were
no direct allegations as to value or fair return. Instead of stating
the value of the property, it is stated that it cost more than the
outstanding stock and bonds, and that they represent actual investment; and instead of fair return, there are the allegations as to
interest and dividends.
I Supra note 15, at 458, io Sup. Ct. at 467.
is154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct. 1047 (1894).
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The Court definitely asserts its jurisdiction to ascertain
whether rates are unjust and unreasonable, and to restrain their
operation if they are. It says:
"Yet it has always been recognized that, if a carrier
attempted to charge a shipper an unreasonable sum, the courts
had jurisdiction to inquire into that matter and to award to
the shipper any amount exacted from him in excess of a reasonable rate; and also in a reverse case to render judgment
in favor of the carrier for the amount found to be a reasonable charge. The province of the courts is not changed, nor
the limit of judicial inquiry altered, because the legislature
instead of the carrier prescribes the rates. The courts are
not authorized to revise or change the body of rates imposed
by a legislature or a commission; they do not determine
whether one rate is preferable to another, or what under all
circumstances would be fair and reasonable as between the
carriers and the shippers; they do not engage in any mere
administrative work; but still there can be no doubt of their
power and duty to inquire whether a body of rates prescribed
by a legislature or a commission is unjust and unreasonable,
and such as to work a practical destruction to rights of property, and if found so to be, to restrain its operation." 19
Having disposed of the jurisdictional matter, the Court took
up the question whether the rates were unjust and unreasonable,
and found that the allegations of the bill were sufficient to support
this contention. In this connection it says:
"The equal protection of the laws-the spirit of common
justice-forbids that one class should by law be compelled to
suffer loss that others may make gain. If the state were to
seek to acquire the title to these roads, under its power of
eminent domain, is there any doubt that constitutional provisions would require the payment to the corporation of just
compensation, that compensation being the value of the property as it stood in the markets of the world, and not as
prescribed by an act of the legislature? Is it any less a
departure from the obligations of justice to seek to take not
the title but the use for the public benefit at less than its
market value ?" 20
Ibid. 397, i4 Sup. Ct. at 1o54.
2Ibid. 410, 14 Sup. Ct. at io59.
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The case of Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v.
Sandford,21 decided about two years later, does not show any
substantial progress toward the definition of what the words "just
and reasonable" require. Like Reagan v. Farmers'Loan & Trust
Co.,2 2 it was disposed of on demurrer. The Court held that rates
so low as to render it impossible for the company to maintain its
road in proper condition or to pay any dividends whatever to its
stockholders were unreasonable and illegal. The question of
value was not discussed. A dictum 23 to the effect that the mere
fact that the company could not earn more than 4 per cent would
not justify setting the rates aside as unconstitutional negatives the
idea that the Court up to this time had recognized the right to a
fair return as distinguished from some return.
Less than a year and a half after this decision, the Court
handed down its opinion in Smyth v. Ames.24 This case definitely
presented to the Court whether it should pass upon the amount of
the profit or return, as well as whether the factor to which this
should be applied should be cost or value. Mr. Webster, one of the
counsel for the state, admitted that a reasonable rate must pay all
of the expenses of operation and something more, and contended
that what this excess over operating expenses should be was a
question of state policy over which the courts could exercise no
control. Mr. William Jennings Bryan, also for the state, contended that if the Court were to pass upon the reasonableness of
this profit, "the present value of the roads, as measured by the cost
of reproduction, is the basis upon which profit should be computed." 25 The railroads, on the other hand, contended for the
cost of the property as measured by the outstanding stocks and
bonds, asserting that rates insufficient to provide for bond interest
and dividends were unreasonable. Mr. Justice Harlan states the
effect of the decisions up to that time as follows:
=164 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 198 (1896).

'Supra note i8.
Supra note 21, at 596, 17 Sup. Ct. at 205.
,Supra note i.
Supra note i, at 489.
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"In view of the adjudications these principles must be
regarded as settled:
"I. A railroad corporation is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment declaring that no state
shall deprive any person of property without due process of
law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
"2. A state enactment, or regulations made under the
authority of a state enactment, establishing rates for the
transportation of persons or property by railroad that will
not admit of the carrier earning such compensation as under
all the circumstances is just to it and to the public, would
deprive such carrier of its property without due process of
law and deny to it the equal protection of the laws, and would
therefore be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States.
"3. While rates for the transportation of persons and
property within the limits of a State are primarily for its
determination, the question whether they are so unreasonably
low as to deprive the carrier of its property without such compensation as the Constitution secures, and therefore without
due process of law, cannot be so conclusively determined by
the legislature of the State or by regulations adopted under
matter may not become the subject of
its authority, that2 the
6
judicial inquiry."

The word "value" first comes into the opinion in the discussion of the contention that the revenue from all of the business of
the companies, state and interstate, should be taken into account,
the Court saying:
"Or, must the rates for such transportation as begins
and ends in the State be established with reference solely to
the amount of business done by the carrier wholly within
such State, to the cost of doing such local business, and to the
fair value of the property used in conductin it, without taking into consideration the amount and cost of its interstate
business, and the value of the property employed in it?" 27
The Court then takes up the contention of the railroads.
Their position is stated as follows:
" Supra note I, at 526, I8 Sup. Ct. at 426.
nSupra note I, at 541, 18 Sup. Ct. at 431.

584

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

"In the discussion of this question, the plaintiffs contended that a railroad company is entitled to exact such
charges for transportation as will enable it, at all times, not
only to pay operating expenses, but also to meet the interest
regularly accruing upon all its outstanding obligations, and
justify a dividend upon all its stock; and that to prohibit it
from maintaining rates or charges for transportation adequate to all those ends will deprive it of its property without
due process of law, and deny to it the equal protection of
the laws. This contention was the subject of elaborate discussion; and, as it bears upon each case in its important
aspects, it should not be passed without examination." 28
The Court denied this contention, and in doing so placed
emphasis upon the value factor, both as applied to the property of
the carrier and the services rendered by it. It says:
"But the rights of the public would be ignored if rates
for the transportation of persons or property on a railroad
are exacted without reference to the fair value of the property
used for the public or the fair value of the services rendered,
but in order simply that the corporation may meet operating
expenses, pay the interest on its obligations, and declare a
dividend to stockholders." 29
The Court then states its conclusion:
"We hold, however, that the basis of all calculations as
to the reasonableness of rates to be charged by a corporation
maintaining a highway under legislative sanction must be the
fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience
of the public." 30
Having determined that value is the basis of these calculations, the Court proceeds to indicate some of the factors to be
taken into account in ascertaining value, saying:
"And in order to ascertain that value, the original cost
of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and stock,
sSupra note I, at 543, 18 Sup. Ct. at 432.

Supra note i, at 544, 18 Sup. Ct. at 433.
SSupra note i, at 546, 18 Sup. Ct. at 434.

FALUE IN CONFISCATION CASES

the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property under
particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required to
meet operating expenses, are all matters for consideration,
and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in
each case. We do not say that there may not be other matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the property." 3
Further summarizing the situation, it says:
"What the company is entitled to ask is a fair return
upon the value of that which it employs foi the public convenience. On the other hand, what the public is entitled to
demand is that no more be exacted from it for the use of a
public highway than the services rendered by it are reasonably
worth." 3'

The rule announced is that, to be just and reasonable, rates
imposed by public authority must afford a fair return upon the
value of the property in question, and that this value is to be ascertained by giving to all factors bearing upon the matter of value
such weight as may be just and right in each case. There is
nothing here to indicate that the word "value" is not used in its
ordinarily accepted sense, or that the Court intended to attach to
it any meaning not in accord with its accepted definition.
Because in Smyth v. Ames the revenues under the proposed
rates would not afford any return, it was unnecessary there to go
into this question of value. Notwithstanding this, the case has
been so frequently cited in the Supreme Court and in other courts
as announcing this rule as to warrant the statement that it is
33
accepted by the courts as the leading case upon this proposition.
The numerous cases which have since arisen assailing particular
rates as confiscatory have all involved attempts to apply this rule.
It is proposed to examine the decisions of the Supreme Court in
these cases to ascertain whether they have modified this rule or
"Supra note i, at .546, i8 Sup. Ct. at 434.
Supra note I, at 547, I8 Sup. Ct. at 434.
'Up to this time (December, 1928), Smyth v. Ames has been cited in decisions of the United States Supreme Court not less than 64 times; in decisions
of the lower federal courts not less than i9o times; and in decisions of state
courts not less than 141 times.
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justify the assumption that the word "value" is not used in its
accepted sense.
34
San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, decided
about fourteen months after Smyth v. Ames, was probably heard
upon a record made up prior to that decision. There was the
same argument for cost as in Smyth v. Ames. The Court follows
Smyth v. Ames, quoting from the opinion much that has been set
out above. As to the contention of the company, it says:
"The basis of calculation suggested by the appellant is,
however, defective in not requiring the real value of the property and the fair value in themselves of the services rendered
to be taken into consideration. What the company is entitled
to demand, in order that it may have just compensation, is a
fair return upon the reasonable value of the property at the
time it is being used for the public. The property may have
cost more than it ought to have cost, and its outstanding
bonds for money borrowed and which went into the plant
may be in excess of the real value of the property. So that
it cannot be said that the amount of such bonds should in
every case control the question of rates, although it may be
an element in the inquiry as to what is, all the circumstances
considered, just both to the company and to the public." 35
The expression "real value," twice used here, strongly negatives any suggestion that the word "value" was not used in its
accepted sense.
36
San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper sought to have
certain water rates fixed by the board of supervisors of San Diego
County declared unreasonable and void. By the statutes of California, under which the board was acting, it was required to adjust
the rates so that the net receipts and profits should be not less than
six nor more than eighteen per cent upon the value of the used
and useful property. The Court reiterates the doctrine of Smyth
v. Ames, saying:
"The main object of attack is the valuation of the plant.
It no longer is open to dispute that under the Constitution
34

174 U. S. 739, ig Sup. Ct. 804 (899).

I Ibd.757, i9Sup. Ct. at 811. The italics are the writer's.
is89
U. S. 439, 23 Sup. Ct. 571 (1903).
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'what the company is entitled to demand, in order that it may
have just compensation, is a fair return upon the reasonable
value of the property at the time it is being used for the public.' San Diego Land and Town Co. v. National City, 174
U. S. 739, 757. That is decided, and is decided as against
the contention that you are to take the actual cost of the
plant, annual depreciation, etc., and to allow a fair profit on
that footing over and above expenses. We see no reason to
doubt that the California statute means the same thing."

37

This case illustrates some of the questions which might arise
if cost instead of value were the factor. The property had been
sold under foreclosure at a price that was less than its original
cost, and was taken in by the plaintiff company at this foreclosure
sale price. The question arose as to whether this fairly measured
the property's value, and as to this the Court says:
"The purchasers organized the present corporation, and
the above-mentioned sum is the cost of the land and waterworks to it. The appellant protests that this is not a fair
value for the property of the company. We doubt whether
it is not a liberal allowance. The officers of the two companies at the time thought that they got more than they could
have got in any other way. But at all events, it is decided
that the price is evidence, we might say more important evidence than the original cost." 38
That the Court, in its use of the word "value," uses it in its
ordinarily accepted sense, is indicated by the following excerpt
from the opinion:
"Of course it is hard to answer the proposition that
value expressed in money depends on what people think at
the time. That determines what they will give for the thing,
and whether they think rightly or wrongly, if they or some
of them will give a certain price for it, that is its value then.
Nevertheless, it has been held, under some circumstances,
even in ordinary suits, that when events have corrected the
prophecy of the public, the facts may be shown and a more
correct valuation adopted. Twycross v. Grant, 2 C. P. D.
17Ibid. 442,

23 Sup. Ct. at
8Ibid. 443, 23 Sup. Ct. at

572.
572.
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469, 544; Peek v. Derry, 37 Ch. D. 541, 591 (not reversed
on this point by 14 App. Cas. 337); Whiting v. Price, 172
Massachusetts, 240. See National Bank of Commerce v.
New Bedford, 175 Massachusetts, 257, 262. We think that
upon the question before us subsequent events may be considered. The facts mentioned would tend to depreciate the
market value of the plant, and very much depreciate the value
of the services rendered to consumers during
the year when
39
the ordinance necessarily was in force."
Six years later came City of Knoxville v. Knoxville W~ater
Co.40 Value is accepted as the basis, and various factors affecting
it are discussed. The Court held that depreciation must be deducted
in order to arrive at value. It determined that in that case the outstanding capitalization was of substantially no weight in ascertaining value. It reversed the case because it did not affirmatively
appear that the ordinance rates would not afford a fair return upon
the value of the property.
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.4 was decided on the same
day. In Mr. Whitney's brief for the commission, it was contended that land should be valued not in excess of its cost, and
manufacturing plants should be valued at what it would cost to
produce a modern plant to do the same work. In Judge Parker's
brief, also for the commission, it was contended that the court
below erred in assigning to the tangible assets any value in excess
of their cost, so that again in this case the issue was distinctly
drawn between cost and value. The Court states the rule for the
disposition of the case as follows:
"The question arising is as to the validity of the acts
limiting the rates for gas to the prices therein stated. The
rule by which to determine the question is pretty well established in this court. The rates must be plainly unreasonable
to the extent that their enforcement would be equivalent to
the taking of property for public use without such compensation as under the circumstances is just both to the owner
'Ibid. 444, 23 Sup. Ct. at 573.
40 212 U. S. i, 29 Sup. Ct. 148 ('9o9).
"212 U. S. 19, 29 Sup. Ct. 192 (i9o9).
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and the public. There must be a fair return upon the reasonable value of the property at the time it is being used for the
public." 42

It proceeds to say:
"In order to determine the rate of return upon the reasonable value of the property at the time it is being used for
the public, it, of course, becomes necessary to ascertain what
that value is." 43

The Court makes no express reference to the contention that cost
should be adopted as the basis.
Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v. City of Lincoln 44
involved the validity of an ordinance fixing rates for gas. The
Court reversed the case, with instructions to the court below to
refer it to a master because the record was in unsatisfactory form.
It says:
"In this, as in every other legislative rate case, there are
presented three questions of prime importance: First, the
present reasonable value of the company's plant engaged in
the regulated business; second, what will be the probable
effect of the reduced rate ulon the future net income from
the property engaged in serving the public; and, third, in
ascertaining the probable net income under the reduced rates
prescribed, what deduction, if any, should be made from the
gross receipts as a fund to preserve the property from future
depreciation.
"The valuation fixed by the court is the main point of
attack. That the company is entitled to a fair return upon
the value of the property at the time of the inquiry, is the
rule." 45

Another case decided in the same year is Cedar Rapids Gas
Light Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids.40

I Ibid. 41, 29 Sup. Ct. at 195.
"Ibid. 41, 29

Sup.

Ct. at

195.

U. S. 349, 32 Sup. Ct. 271 (1912).
"Ibid. 357, 32 Sup. Ct. at 272.
AB223 U. S. 655, 32 Sup. Ct. 389 (i912).
"4223

The case assumes that
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value is the basis, and is devoted largely to the discussion of items
bearing upon this question.
In the next year came the very well-known Minnesota Rate
Cases.47 One question presented was whether certain rates established by authority of the state were confiscatory. Mr. Jugtice
Hughes very clearly outlines the general principles as follows:
"But the general principles which are applicable in a
case of this character have been set forth in the decisions.
"(i) The basis of calculation is the 'fair value of the

property' used for the convenience of the public. Smyth v.
Ames, supra (p. 546). Or, as it was put in San Diego Land
& Town Co. v. National City, supra (p. 757), 'What the
company is entitled to demand, in order that it may have just
compensation, is a fair return upon the reasonable value of
the property at the time it is being used for the public.' See
also San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper,supra; WilIcox
v. Consolidated Gas Co., supra.
"(2) The ascertainment of that value is not controlled
by artificial rules. It is not a matter of formulas, but there
must be a reasonable judgment having its basis in a proper
consideration of all relevant facts."

48

Immediately following the excerpt just made, the rule for
the ascertainment of value is quoted from Smyth v. Ames. The
Court negatives the cost theory, saying:
"It is clear that in ascertaining the present value we are
not limited to the consideration of the amount of the actual
investment. If that has been reckless or improvident, losses
may be sustained which the community does not underwrite.
As the company may not be protected in its actual investment, if the value of its property be plainly less, so the
making of a just return for the use of the property involves
the recognition of its fair value if it be more than its cost.
The property is held in private ownership and it is that property, and not the original cost of it, of which the owner may
not be deprived without due process of law."
4T

49

23o U. S. 352,33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1913).

'8 Ibld. 434, 33 Sup. Ct. at 754. The discussion of the question of value begins at 433, 33 Sup. Ct. at 754.
"Ibid. 454, 33 Sup. Ct. at 762.
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Des Moines Gas Co. z'. City of Des lfoines 50 involved ordinance rates for gas. Value was taken as the basis, and in ascertaining it, the reproduction method was used. As stated by the
Court, the correctness of the decree below depended upon whether
two items-$3oo,ooo on account of going-concern value, and
$i4o,ooo, the cost of removing and replacing pavements over

mains-had been wrongfully excluded. The Court made the following excerpt from the opinion in the Cedar Rapids case:
" 'As said, the value of the system as completed, earning
a present income, is the criterion. In so far as influenced by
income, however, the computation necessarily must be made
on the basis of reasonable charges, for whatever is exacted
for a public service in excess of this is to be regarded as
unlawful.'" "
5
Newark Natural Gas & Fuel Co. v. Cit of Newark, Ohio, involved an ordinance rate for natural gas. The following, taken
from the opinion, indicates that value was here recognized as the
basis:
"The opinions of the state courts show that they gave
careful consideration to the questions of the value of the
property of plaintiff in error at the time of the inquiry, the
total amount of net profits that could be earned under the
rate fixed, and whether this would be sufficient to provide a
fair return on the value of the property. The concurring
judgments were based upon principles thoroughly established
by repeated decisions of this court, Covinigton &c- Turnpike
Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 597, 598; San Diego Land
Company v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 754; Knoxville v.
Knoxzille Water Co., 212 U. S. I; Willcox v. Consolidated
Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19. 48; Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des
Moines, 238 U. S. 153, 163; and the finding that there was
no confiscation is amply supported by the evidence." '-*

Darnell v. Edwards 5 4 involved the reasonableness of certain
railroad rates. The Court stated:
'0238 U. S. 153, 35 Sup. Ct. 811 (91S).

' Ibid. 16, 35 Sup. Ct. at 8M6.
M242 U. S. 405, 37 Sup. Ct. I56 (1917).
'Ibid. 407, 37 Sup. Ct. at 157.
244 U. S. 564, 37 Sup. Ct. 701 (917).
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"In determining whether rates are confiscatory because
not yielding a proper return, the basis of calculation is the
fair value of the property used in the service of the public." '5
Denver v. Denver Union Water Co.5 6 involved ordinance
rates for water. A decree holding the rates confiscatory was
affirmed. No basis other than value is suggested. It is said:
"What we have said establishes the propriety of estimating complainant's property on the basis of present market
values as to land, and reproduction cost, less depreciation, as
to structures. That this method was fairly applied by the
special master hardly is disputed by appellants, except as they
contest the items allowed for 'going-concern value' and for
the water rights acquired by complainant and its predecessors
by original appropriation."

57

The Court disposed of the two disputed items by holding that
the going-concern value item should be included, and that it was
unnecessary to determine as to water rights because if they were
excluded, the return would still be inadequate.
Galveston Electric Co. v. City of Galveston 58 involved the
contention that a five-cent fare upon the street railroad in that
city was confiscatory. Each party accepted value as the basis.
The Court states their contentions as follows:
"The company contends that the fare prescribed is confiscatorv in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; the city
that it is sufficient to yield a return of 8 per cent. on the value
of the property used in the public service." "
The opinion is devoted to the consideration of disputed items
bearing upon the value factor, and some disputed items relating to
operating expenses.
In the same year Houston v. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co. 60 was decided.

In this case, telephone rates established by an

Ibid. 568, 37 Sup. Ct. at
'6246

702.

U. S. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. 278 (1988).

'Ibid. 191, 38 Sup. Ct. at 283.
U. S. 388, 42 Sup. Ct. 35, (1922).
,Ibid. 390, 42 Sup. Ct. at 353.
°259 U. S..318, 42 Sup. Ct 486 (1922).
58258
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ordinance of the city of Houston were the subject of the controversy. There had been a merger of the telephone properties
under an ordinance by which the company agreed that it would
not increase the rates then charged in the city
" 'unless it appears upon a satisfactory showing . . . that
there exists a necessity for an increase of charges, in order
that the said company may earn a fair return upon its capital
actually invested in the Houston plant.' " "I
It was entirely clear that the company was not earning a fair
return upon the value of the property. The city contended that
this ordinance made cost the basis, thus presenting the cost question from another aspect. The company contended that the ordinance was not binding upon it and the Court sustained this contention.
Obviously, if the law made cost the basis, it would have been
immaterial whether the ordinance also attempted to do so, and so
immaterial whether the ordinance was void or not, rendering it
unnecessary for the Court to determine that question.
Having held the ordinance void, the court below held that the
acts of the company had estopped it from contending that it was
not bound by its terms. Under these circumstances, the opinion
says:
"We think that neither party was bound by the ordinance and the acceptance of it, that the District Court fell
into error, and that the proper base for rate-making in the
case is the fair value of the property, useful and used by the
company, at the time of the inquiry." 62
Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co. 63 was also decided in 1922.
It involved the same statute which was in controversy in Willcox
v. Consolidated Gas Co. 6 4

Value was the basis adopted.

Court said:
Ibid. 32o, 42 Sup. Ct. at 487.
Ibid. 324, 42 Sup. Ct. at 489.
"258 U. S. 165, 42 Sup. Ct 264 (1922).
MSupra note 41.

The
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"The fundamental question presented for determination
was whether the eighty-cent rate had been confiscatory under
conditions existing during 1918 and i9i9 and probably would

continue so to be. Considering the rulings here in Willcox
v. Consolidated Gas Co. and other cases, the answer required
little more than an appreciation of facts not very difficult to
ascertain. The Master's report and opinion disclosed careful
and. intelligent consideration of the whole matter. 'Resolving all doubts against the plaintiff' and using valuations
'pared down unsparingly,' the trial court agreed with the
Master's ultimate findings and ruled that to enforce the statute would result in confiscation." 15

In affirming the conclusion of the court below as clearly
,right, the Court reaffirmed many of the cases to which reference
has been made, saying:
"The general doctrine applicable when rates are alleged
to be confiscatory has been so often stated that present discussion of it is unnecessary. Knoxville v. Knoxville Water
Co., 212 U. S. I ; Willcox v. ConsolidatedGas Co., 212 U. S.
i9; Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U. S. 153;

Rowland v. St. Louis & San FranciscoR. R. Co., 244 U. S.
io6; Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U. S. 178;
Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Lincoln, 250 U. S.
256." 66
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commis-

sion 67 involved a schedule of telephone rates. It was reversed
because in ascertaining the value factor the Court held that no
weight had been accorded to the greatly enhanced current costs of
material, labor and supplies. In this connection, the Court cited
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.6s and the Minnesota Rate
Cases,69 among others, and quoted from the Minnesota Rate Cases
the following:
Supra note 63, at 174, 42 Sup. Ct. at 266.
Supra note 63, at 176, 42 Sup. Ct. at 267.
6T262 U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544 (923).
, SuPra note 41.

Supra note 47.
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" 'The making of a just return for the use of the property involves the recognition of its fair value if it be more
than its cost. The property is held in private ownership and
it is that property, and not the original cost of it, of which
the owner may not be deprived without due process of
law.' " 70
The Court also says:
"It is impossible to ascertain what will amount to a fair
return upon properties devoted to public service without giving consideration to the cost of labor, supplies, etc., at the
time the investigation is made. An honest and intelligent
forecast of probable future values made upon a view of all
the relevant circumstances, is essential. If the highly important element of present costs is wholly disregarded such a
forecast becomes impossible. Estimates for tomorrow cannot ignore prices of today." 71
Georgia Railway & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission 72
involved gas rates established by the Georgia commission for the
city of Atlanta. It was contended by the company in that case
that the cost of reproduction at current prices, less depreciation,
must be adopted as fixing the value factor. Following its earlier
decisions, the Court refused to accept this contention. It had not
held in Smyth v. Ames,7 3 or in any subsequent case, that the cost
of reproduction, less depreciation, or any other single factor, is a
measure of value. It had consistently held that all material factors should be taken into account, and this position it maintained.
It says:
,.The refusal of the Commission and of the lower court
to hold that, for rate-making purposes, the physical properties
of a utility must be valued at the replacement cost less depreciation was clearly' correct. As was said in Minnesota Rate
Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 434: 'The ascertainment of that value
Supra note 67, at 287, 43 Sup. Ct. at 546.
Supra note 67, at 287, 43 Sup. Ct. at 546.
n262 U. S. 625, 43 Sup. Ct. 68o (1923).
' Supra note

I.
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is not controlled by artificial rules. It is not a matter of formulas, but there must be a reasonable judgment having its
basis in a proper consideration of all relevant facts.'" 74
Another case decided in 1923 is Bluefield Water Works &
Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission. 75 The rates
involved were those established by the West Virginia commission
for water in Bluefield. The appeal was from the Supreme Court
of West Virginia. As to the holding of that court, the opinion
states:
"The State Supreme Court of Appeals holds that the
valuing of the property of a public utility corporation and
prescribing rates are purely legislative acts not subject to
judicial review except in so far as may be necessary to determine whether such rates are void on constitutional or other
grounds; and that findings of fact by the commission based
on evidence to support them will not be reviewed by the
Court." 76

In the same general connection, the Supreme Court quotes
from the Supreme Court of West Virginia the following:
" 'It seems to be generally held that, in the absence of
peculiar and extraordinary conditions, such as a more costly
plant than the public service of the community requires, or
the erection of a plant at an actual, though extravagant, cost,
or the purchase of one at an exorbitant or inflated price, the
actual amount of money invested is to be taken as the basis,
and upon this a return must be allowed equivalent to that
which is ordinarily received in the .locality in which the business is done, upon capital invested in similar enterprises.'" 7
Here again the cost theory presents itself. The Supreme
Court discards it, and reaffirms the doctrine that the fair return
must be upon the reasonable value of the property, to be deter"' Supra note 72, at 630, 43 Sup. Ct. at 681.
1262 U. S. 679, 43 Sup. Ct. 675 (1923).

"'Ibid.688, 43 Sup. Ct. at 677.
Ibid. 689, 43 Sup. Ct. at 678.

VALUE IN CONFISCATION CASES

mined through the application of reasonable judgment to all of the
relevant facts, citing a number of its decisions and quoting from
the Minnesota Rate Cases a statement that fair value must be
recognized if it is more than cost, saying:
". .The making of a just return for the use of
the property involves the recognition of its fair value if it be
more than its cost. The property is held in private ownership and it is that property, and not the original cost of it,
of which the owner may not be deprived without due process
of law.'

" 78

McCardle v. Indiaizapolis Water Co.7" involved the validity
of rates established by the Indianapolis Water Company and required a determination of the value of the property. The Court
says:
"But this does not mean that the original cost or the
present cost or some figure arbitrarily chosen between these
two is to be taken as the measure. The weight to be given
to such cost figures and other items or classes of evidence is
to be determined in the light of the facts of the case in
hand." 80

The Court dearly distinguishes between cost and value.
adopts value-not cost-as the basis. The Court says:

It

"Undoubtedly, the reasonable cost of a system of waterworks, well-planned and efficient for the public service, is
good evidence of its value at the time of construction. And
such actual cost will continue fairly well to measure the
amount to be attributed to the physical elements of the property so long as there is no change in the level of applicable
prices. And, as indicated by the report of the commission,
it is true that, if the tendency or trend of prices is not definitely upward or downward and it does not appear probable
that there will be a substantial change of prices, then the presIbid. 691, 43 Sup. Ct. at 678.
S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144
"Ibid. 410, 47 Sup. Ct. at 148.
"0272 U.

(1926).
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ent value of lands plus the present cost of constructing the
plant, less depreciation, if any, is a fair measure of the value
of the physical elements of the property. The validity of the
rates in question depends on property value January 1, 1924,
and for a reasonable time following. While the values of
such properties do not vary with frequent minor fluctuations
in the prices of material and labor required to produce them,
they are affected by and generally follow the relatively permanent levels and trends of such prices. The fact that original cost was probably 12 to 20 per cent. less than the estimate
of the commission's engineer based on the average of prices
for the ten years ending with 192I-two years before the rate
order became effective-does not tend to support the commission's adoption of that estimate." 8.
CONCLUSIONS

The outstanding, salient points in these cases, covering a
period of thirty years since Smyth v. Ames, 2 are:
I. The criterion to be used in determining whether rates are
confiscatory is value.
2. This is not to be measured by cost; it is value as distinguished from cost.

3. The ascertainment of value "is not a matter of formulas"
or "artificial rules."
4. No one factor, such as cost or cost of reproduction less
depreciation, may be taken as an arbitrary measure of value.
5. Value is to be ascertained as the value of other classes of
property is ascertained-by the exercise of "a reasonable judgment having its basis in a proper consideration of all relevant
facts." What facts are relevant, and the weight to which they
are entitled, will vary with the circumstances of particular cases.
The presumption that the language used by the Court in its
opinions is used accurately is conclusive. When the Court says
"Ibid. 411, 47 Sup. Ct. at
"Supra note i.

148.
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"value" or "real value" or "reasonable value" or "fair value," it
means just what it says. To assert where the Court says one
thing that what it means is some other and different thing would
be to abandon certainty for pure speculation.
The difficulty in determining value in applying this rule does
not militate against its soundness. This difficulty is just as real
as to property generally as it is as to property of public utilities.
But for many years the values of all classes of property, including
that of public utilities, have been constantly determined in connection with ordinary commercial transactions with all of the practical certainty which is required for the successful conduct of
business.
The fact is that grossly divergent estimates of the value of
public utility property, like such estimates of the value of other
property, are in general due to conflicting interests. When both
parties begin to co-operate in an earnest effort to ascertain the
actual value of the property in question, these divergencies will
practically disappear.
Nor does the fact that most of the states have attempted to
regulate the rates of their utilities sustain the contention that for
this reason these properties may not be valued as accurately as
other property. Without attempting to discuss this theory, it is
sufficient to offset against it the fact that ever since there have been
public utilities, their values have been ascertained and fixed for the
purpose of purchase and sale and for the other purposes that are
incidental to ordinary commercial transactions. What has been
and is being done in these commercial transactions can be done
and is actually being done in regulatory proceedings. The complete answer to the scientific demonstration that a ball could not
be thrown on a curve was the fact that it actually did curve.
In this connection it must be remembered that the commission
laws of the states do not establish a new regulation with reference
to rates. Their regulation is that rates shall be just and reasonable. This is not new. It has always been the rule applicable to
the rates of public utilities. Fundamentally, what is new in these
laws is their machinery for the enforcement of old regulations.
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Finally, the rule laid down in Smyth v. Ames is equitable.
The valuation is for the purpose of determining whether or not
proposed rates are confiscatory. The criterion, based upon the
actual value of what is devoted to the public use, is equitable.
Equity requires that the owner of the property be protected to this
extent-no more and no less. And this is fair to the customer of
the utility. He is only asked to leave unimpaired what is actually
being devoted to his service.

